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The Chinese Communist Government has the following views on the Korean truce negotiations:

- a. The Chinese Communists wish a successful conclusion of the Panmunjon talks but want the Soviets and North Koreans to bear full responsibility for the initiating talks and results, whatever they may be. Because the Soviets supplied them with planes and other materiel, the Communists were in no position to suggest peace overtures and had to wait until the Soviets would agree to such talks.
- b. The Communists are not convinced that Soviet military strength in the long run will be a match for that of the United States, and they are anxious to get out of Korea and consolidate their own internal position.
- c. Despite these above views the Communists are not prepared to sign a peace until the United Nations give them complete diplomatic recognition or until the Soviets compensate them for their losses in the war.¹
- d. While delaying the peace signing, the Communists hope to extend their power in Manchuria by planting loyal MAO followers in political and economic positions and by concentrating troops there.²
- e. The Communists believe the Soviet proposal of truce negotiations restored the prestige lost by the Communists in their Korean defeat. The Communists have profited in the war by the Soviet equipment sent them, and the war has also given them an opportunity to eliminate former Chinese Nationalist troops incorporated into the Communist forces. By the end of 1951 about 20 percent of these troops were casualties in Korea; in January 1952 about 70 percent of the Chinese troops in Korea were former Nationalists, while veteran Communist troops remained in China training recruits (F-6).

1. Comment. Most reports state the Chinese Communists as being opposed to a cease fire, which the Soviets first proposed, on Soviet terms. See

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[REDACTED] Comment. Subsequent advice from field representatives indicates that for the most part reports [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Lacking a statement as to how the Chinese Communist Government could admit such views, however, it can only be assumed that at least some of the points are heavily weighted by the opinion of nationalistic Chinese Communists.

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